

## Message Text

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S E C R E T STATE 294506

NODIS  
CHEROKEE

FOR SCRANTON ONLY

FOL REPEAT LUSAKA 3179 ACTION SECSTATE NOV 27, 1976

QUOTE

S E C R E T LUSAKA 3179

NODIS CHEROKEE

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1  
TAGS: PFOR RH ZA US UK  
SUBJ: MEETING WITH PRESIDENT KAUNDA  
SUMMARY: MEETING WITH KAUNDA MARKED BY VERY FRANK,  
EXTENDED EXCHANGES BUT WITH UNSATISFACTORY RESULTS  
FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW. IN EFFECT, HE IS SUPPORTING CHONA  
POSITION THAT SMITH'S ROLE IN GENEVA IS TO  
SURRENDER WITHOUT CONDITIONS. US-UK ROLE IS TO MAKE  
CERTAIN THAT UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER IS EXPEDITIOUS.  
LAMELY ARGUES THAT ANY INSISTENCE ON NEGOTIATING WITH  
SMITH IS "A NEW ELEMENT". END SUMMARY.

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1. I SAW PRES KAUNDA, WITH LOW, IN A MEETING WHICH  
LASTED WELL OVER AN HOUR AND WAS CHARACTERIZED BY THE  
FRANKEST GIVE AND TAKE I HAVE YET HAD WITH HIM. HE  
WAS AN HOUR LATE IN RECEIVING ME BECAUSE HE WAS ON THE  
PHONE WITH CHONA AND HAD TO SEE THE DOCTOR BECAUSE OF A DENTAL

ABCESS WHICH CONTINUES TO BOTHER HIM.

2. KAUNDA INDICATED HE WAS GLAD TO SEE ME AND NOTED THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT WE CONTINUE TO CONSULT. NO MATTER HOW SHORT THE NOTICE, MY VISIT WAS MOST WELCOME. I REVIEWED THE POINTS CONTAINED IN MY INSTRUCTIONS, TOUCHING ON EACH OF THEM AT DIFFERENT TIMES IN THE CONVERSATION.

3. NATIONALIST SPLIT

A. I ASKED KAUNDA ABOUT REPORTS IN NAIROBI PAPERS PROJECTING A SPLIT BETWEEN NKOMO AND MUGABE. HE RESPONDED THAT, AS EVERYONE KNEW, NKOMO WAS IN FAVOR OF ACCEPTING THE BRITISH PROPOSAL BASED ON POSSIBLE INDEPENDENCE BY 1 DECEMBER 1977, BUT 1 MARCH 1978 AS THE FINAL DATE, WHICH WAS "NOW SEALED". MUGABE EVEN EARLIER WOULD HAVE COME ALONG, BUT THREE OR FOUR "DIFFICULT CHARACTERS" IN HIS GROUP WERE UNABLE TO UNDERSTAND. THEY APPEARED TO BE ACTING AS NATIONALISTS HAVE OCCASIONALLY ACTED IN THE PAST, THINKING MORE OF THEMSELVES THAN OF THE ZIMBABWEAN PEOPLE AS A WHOLE. THE SPLIT IS WITHIN THE MUGABE WING. SOME OF THE ZANU PEOPLE WERE THINKING OF LEAVING THE CONFERENCE, BUT, KAUNDA SAID, HE TALKED THEM OUT OF IT BY AGREEING TO PAY FOR SOME OF THEIR COLLEAGUES TO GO TO GENEVA. HE SAID HE WAS DOING EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO SEE SENSE IN THE BRITISH APPROACH, AND THE FRONTLINE WAS SPEAKING WITH ONE VOICE.

B. TOWARD THE END OF THE CONVERSATION, I ASKED KAUNDA WHAT HE THOUGHT WOULD HAPPEN IF A SPLIT EVENTUALLY OCCURRED. HE WAS QUITE CLEAR IN REPLYING THAT HE AND THE FRONTLINE WOULD OPPOSE ANY "PUPPET GOVERNMENT" WHICH SMITH ESTABLISHED FROM ELEMENTS  
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OTHER THAN THOSE NOW PRESENT IN GENEVA. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, THEY WOULD SUPPORT CONTINUATION OF THE WAR. WITH REGARD TO A GOVERNMENT WHICH INCLUDES THE GENEVA NATIONALISTS, WHILE SITHOLE AND MUZOREWA WERE LEGITIMATE NATIONALISTS, THEY HAD NO TROOPS. ZAPU AND ZANU BOTH HAD GUERRILLA FORCES. THERE WOULD THEREFORE BE DIFFICULTIES IF THE GOVERNMENT WAS FORMED WITHOUT THEM. IF ONE WAS LEFT OUT, THERE WOULD BE PROBLEMS, BUT, KAUNDA SAID, " WE COULD CONTROL THE OTHER ONE".

4. COUNCIL OF STATE AND ROLE OF SMITH

A. I DESCRIBED OUR VIEW THAT CONSIDERATION OF A COUNCIL OF STATE MUST BE PART OF THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS WITH

SMITH EVEN IF IT IS ULTIMATELY REJECTED IN THE DISCUSSIONS. THE PROBLEM, AS WE SEE IT, IS SEEMING PRIOR REJECTION OF THE CONCEPT AFTER OUR LENGTHY DISCUSSIONS OF IT IN SEPTEMBER. KAUNDA REPLIED THAT HE HAD ALL ALONG EMPHASIZED THAT AMERICANS WERE NOT USED TO THE BRITISH SYSTEM OF NEGOTIATIONS THROUGH WHICH ALL THE AFRICAN COUNTRIES HAD ACHIEVED INDEPENDENCE. THE DETERMINING FACTOR WAS A CONFERENCE PRESIDED OVER BY A BRITISH MINISTER OR MINISTER OF STATE. THERE WERE NO EXCEPTIONS TO THIS PATTERN. THE DECISIONS AT SUCH A CONFERENCE WOULD HAVE TO BE TAKEN BY THE BRITISH, SMITH AND THE NATIONALISTS. THE FRONTLINE WAS NOT IMPORTANT. THE SAME WAS TRUE OF THE MOZAMBIQUE EXPERIENCE WHICH, HE SAID, HE HAD DESCRIBED TO THE SECRETARY. (THIS REFERENCE MAY BE CLEAR TO THE SECRETARY BUT IS NOT TO ME. APPARENTLY KAUNDA REFERS TO HIS OWN ROLE AS A MEDIATOR AT A LUSAKA CONFERENCE SEEKING TO BRIDGE GAPS BETWEEN THE PORTUGUESE AND FRELIMO.) HE SAID HE HAD ALSO MENTIONED HIS PREFERENCE FOR A GOVERNOR GENERAL OR A HIGH COMMISSIONER. ALL THESE POINTS, HE SOMEWHAT LAMELY ARGUED, SHOWED CLEARLY HIS STRONG FEELING THAT HE WAS NOT IN FAVOR OF A COUNCIL OF STATE. THE MATTER HAD BEEN BROUGHT UP BY THE SECRETARY AFTER THE SOUTHERN AFRICA VISIT. KAUNDA HAD REFUSED TO SPEAK ABOUT IT PUBLICLY BEFORE THE FRONTLINE

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MEETING UNLIKE HIS COLLEAGUE IN DAR, WE SHOULD REMEMBER. IT IS THE BRITISH PRESENCE WHICH HE HAS ALL ALONG THOUGHT IMPORTANT. HE SAID THE BRITISH COULD MAKE THEIR OFFER, AND SMITH AND THE NATIONALISTS THEIR PRESENTATION, BUT IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE NATIONALISTS, AS A TEAM, WOULD THROW OUT THE CONCEPT OF A COUNCIL OF STATE.

B. I NOTED OUR IMPRESSION THAT THE NATIONALISTS ARE IN EFFECT DEMANDING UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER FROM SMITH. THE PROCESS WHICH HAD BEEN ENVISIONED CALLED FOR AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT TO BE SET UP AND MAJORITY RULE APPLIED AT THE END OF A PERIOD OF TWO YEARS OR LESS, NOT AT THE BEGINNING. WHAT HAPPENS IN THE INTERIM PERIOD IS THE PROBLEM WE ARE CONSIDERING. KAUNDA CAME QUITE EXERCISED, DENYING THAT THIS WAS A PROBLEM, MAKING QUITE CLEAR THAT IT WAS SMITH'S INSISTENCE ON PLAYING A PROMINENT ROLE IN THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT WHICH DISTURBED HIM. HE EXPRESSED HIS SUSPICION OF THE BRITISH, WHO MUST HAVE SOMETHING UP THEIR SLEEVE IF THEY CANNOT AGREE TO APPOINT A HIGH COMMISSIONER. SUCH AN OFFICIAL WOULD COMMAND THE IMMEDIATE LOYALTY AND RESPECT OF THE ONLY IMPORTANT WHITES --THOSE WHO WANT TO STAY. THEY CANNOT LOOK TO

SMITH FOR LEADERSHIP, ONLY TO THE BRITISH. HE APPEALED TO US NOT TO GIVE VITH ANY HOPE THAT A COUNCIL OF STATE COULD BE ESTABLISHED. SMITH SHOULD NOT BE INVOLVED AT ALL. I SUGGESTED THAT THE CONCEPT OF A COUNCIL OF STATE DOES NOT NECESSARILY INVOLVE SMITH HIMSELF, BUT KAUNDA WOULD PREFER TO TAKE NO CHANCES AND INSISTED THAT THE COUNCIL WAS A BRITSH SCHEME TO AVOID ACCEPTING THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES.

C. I ASKED KAUNDA HOW A GOVERNOR GENERAL COULD OPERATE WITHOUT POWER AND HOW HE COULD BRING IN THE GUERRILLAS. THE PRESIDENT TRIED TO PROJECT HIS CONCEPT BY SAYING THAT ONCE IT WAS AGREED THEREWOULD BE TRANSFER OF POWERTO A GOVERNOR GENERAL, WHITES AND BLACKS FROM ALL WALKS OF LIFE WOULD WELCOME HIM AS A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE QUEEN AND AN OPPORTUNITY TO RETURN TO LEGALITY. SOLDIERS, POLICEMEN, SECRET

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BUSINESSMEN--ALL WOULD LOOK TO THE GOVERNOR GENERAL TO ORGANIZE A NEW GOVERNMENT. KAUNDA ENVISIONED A DEFENSE AND SECURITY COUNCIL UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF THE PRIME MINISTER WITH THE GOVERNOR GENERAL AS COMMANDER IN CHIEF. THE PRIME MINISTER COULD HAVE A NUMBER OF OTHER MINISTERS WHO WOULD ADVISE HIM ON THE USE AND DISPOSITION OF THESE FORCES. SINCE THE ZANU AND ZAPU LEADERS WOULD BE MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNMENT, THEY WOULD AGREE ON PROPORTIONAL NUMBERS OF THEIR FORCES TO BE ABSORBED INTO THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT. THE REST WOULD BE INTEGRATED INTO A ZIMBABWEAN NATIONAL SERVICE WHICH WOULD UNDERTAKE VARIOUS PROJECTS.

D. THE PRESIDENT RETURNED AGAIN AND AGAIN TO THE ROLE SMITH IS SEEKING TO PLAY. SINCE SMITH HAD AGREED TO MAJORITY RULE WITHIN 21 MONTHS, AND THREE MONTHS WLLL SOON HAVE PASSED, WHY DOES HE BITTERLY ATTEMPT TO HANG ON TO HIS POSITION FOR THE 21 REMAINING MONTHS? COULDN'T HE SEE HE WAS DESTROYING THE POSSIBILITY OF A REASONABLE SETTLEMENT AND DENYING TO THE NATIONALISTS THE OPPORTUNITY OF ASSUMING THEIR LEADERSHIP ROLE? HE SHOULD BE TOLD HE WAS FINISHED --OUT. AND THE AMERICANS AND BRITISH WERE THE ONES TO DO IT. I NOTED THAT WE HAD MADE VERY CLEAR TO HIM THAT HE WOULD RECEIVE NO ASSISTANCE IN HELPING TO FIGHT AFRICANS BUT THAT NEITHER WE NOR THE BRITISH, NOR EVEN THE SOUTH AFRICANS, COULD TELL HIM THAT NOW, AT THE BEGINNING OF THIS PROCESS, HE MUST STEP ASIDE. THERE WAS NO QUESTION ABOUT WHAT WOULD HAPPEN AT THE END. THERE MUST BE A PROCESS OF NEGOTIATION WITH SMITH IN GENEVA BECAUSE HE IS THE ONE WHO NOW HOLDS POWER. IF A TRANSITION TO MAJORITY RULE HAD TO BE ACCOMPLISHED BY WARAN THE NATIONALISTS NOW IN GENEVA

WOULD ALL BE DESTROYED. KAUNDA REPLIED THAT THEY HAD SURVIVED TEN YEARS ALREADY, IMPLYING THEY WOULD BE AROUND LONGER. AND AGAIN HE ASKED WHY WE ARE FAILING TO CONVINCE SMITH THAT HE SHOULD ABANDON POWER. I TRIED TO EXPLAIN TO THE PRESIDENT THAT SMITH MUST BE DEALT WITH BECAUSE HE WAS THERE, BUT KAUNDA ONLY SHOOK HIS HEAD AND EXPRESSED HIS HOPE THAT WE NOT LET THIS OPPORTUNITY SLIP THROUGH OUR HANDS JUST BECAUSE WE  
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WANT SMITH TO PLAY A ROLE. AGAIN I REPEATED THE SECRETARY'S VIEW THAT THIS MUST RESULT FROM NEGOTIATIONS. NEITHER BRITAIN NOR WEHAD THE POWER TO FORCE HIM TO TURN OVER AUTHORITY NOW, AS HAD BEEN ENVISIONED FROM THE BEGINNING. KAUNDA DISINGENUOUSLY SAID HE FELT THIS ARGUMENT WAS A NEW ELEMENT BEING INTRODUCED--THE IDEA OF NEGOTIATING WITH SMITH. I ASKED HIM WHY HAD WE COME TO GENEVA IF NOT FOR THAT PURPOSE. HE SIMPLY SLID AWAY FROM ANSWERING.

##### 5. ROLE OF THE SECRETARY

A. IN RESPONSE TO MY QUERY ABOUT WHAT THE SECRETARY COULD DO IN THE TWO MONTHS REMAINING TO HIM, KAUNDA HAD A NUMBER OF THOUGHTS. FIRST, WITH REGARD TO NAMIBIA, HE SAIDHE HAD NO SUGGESTIONS. HE HAD NOT SEEN NUJOMA AND HAD HAD NO CONTACT WITH HIM. HE FELT THERE WAS A BASIS FOR AGREEMENT BUT THERE WAS NOTHING HE COULD DO ABOUT IT. THE MOST IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION WHICH THE SECRETARY COULD MAKE WOULD BE TO GET HIS FRIEND JIM CALLAGHAN TO UNDERSTAND THAT THOUGH THE BRITISH ECONOMY WAS WEAK AND HE HAD MANY PROBLEMS, HE NEVERTHELESS HAD A RESPONSIBILITY TO AGREE TO A BRITISH ROLE IN AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT FOR THE GOOD OF THE BLACK AND WHITE PEOPLE OF RHODESIA. ONLY A BRITISH GOVERNOR GENERAL COULD MEET THAT CONTINUITY OF LEADERSHIP--SUPPOSETHE MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL OF STATE RESIGNED, KAUNDA SKED. WHO WOULD PROVIDE CONTINUITY? THE AUTHORITY OF A COUNCIL OF STATE WOULD END UP WITH THE RHODESIANS. THE SECRETARY MUST CONVINCE THE BRITISH TO TAKE THE OTHER ROAD TO A GOVERNOR GENERAL. FORCE WOULD NOT BE NECESSARY. LET CALLAGHAN KNOW HE HAD THE SUPPORT OF THE UNITED STATES SO HE WOULD NOT FEEL SO WEAK. SECONDLY, KAUNDA SUGGESTED THAT WE LET VORSTER KNOW THAT THE PRICE OF GOLD DEPENDS ON THE UNITED STATES. IF THE US DUMPED GOLD ON THE MARKET, THE PRICE WOULD FALL AND VORSTER WOULD BE IN SERIOUS TROUBLE. THE US HAS THE ECONOMIC POWER TO FORCE VORSTER TO BRING PEACE TO RHODESIA. "LET THIS BE THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S LAST ACT--IT WOULD GO A LONG WAY TO HELPING  
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US HERE START AFRESH TOWARDS PEACE AND NON-RACIALISM."

B. KAUNDA SAID HE HOPED TO MEET THE SECRETARY AND  
PRESIDENT FORDAS FRIENDS IN PRIVATE LIFE.

6. COMMENT: EVEN WITHOUT KAUNDA'S STATEMENT THAT  
HE HAD JUST TALKED WITH CHONA, IT IS CLEAR THAT THIS  
KEY ADVISER HAS BEEN WORKING HARD. KAUNDA'S REMARKS  
TODAY WERE A RE-PLAYING OF THE CHONA THEMES WHICH I  
HEARD IN GENEVA LAST WEEK. WHATEVER THE INFLUENCE  
ON KAUNDA--EITHER CHONA OR NYERERE OR BOTH--HE IN EFFECT  
IS NOW REJECTING THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS AS CLEARLY  
DEvised AND UNDERSTOOD IN SEPTEMBER. HE IS JOINING  
IN THE CALL FOR THE DELIVERY OF SMITH'S HEAD ON THE  
MOST CONVENIENT US-UK PLATTER. MY EXCHANGES WITH  
HIM ON THE SUBJECTS OF NEGOTIATION AND COMPROMISE  
WERE PROTRACTED AND HAD DIRECT REFERENCE TO THE  
SECRETARY'S SEPTEMBER DISCUSSIONS WITH KAUNDA.  
THOUGH HIS RETORTS WERE LAME AND DISINGENUOUS, THEY  
WERE ALSO FIRM. THE MESSAGE TO US: GET RID OF SMITH  
NOW, AT THE BEGINNING OF THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT, NOT  
ON THE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE. I LEFT HIM WITH NO DOUBT  
THAT HE IS MAKING A NEW, IMPOSSIBLE DEMAND. HE LEFT  
ME TO UNDERSTAND THAT HE CONSIDERS OUR POSITION A "NEW  
ELEMENT" WHICH I REJECTED BUT WHICH HE SIMPLY REPEATED.  
THE OBSERVER TO WATCH IN GENEVA IS CHONA; FROM LUSAKA  
HE SEEMS TO BE THE PRINCIPAL INFLUENCE ON THE ZAMBIAN  
BRANCH OF THE FRONTLINE. LOW

UNQUOTE ROBINSON

SECRET

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